In his provocative new book “Choose Defeat,” Paul Miller, a former US National Security Council official, dissects the reasons behind the American failure in Afghanistan. Miller argues that the outcome was not caused by a single turning point but was the result of accumulated bad decisions, structural mismanagement, and political short-sightedness over two decades .
The book highlights how early military successes created a false sense of security, leading policymakers to believe the Taliban were defeated when they had merely retreated. Miller is critical of both political parties and even his own past decisions, noting that distractions like the Iraq war allowed the crisis in Afghanistan to deepen unchecked .
Ultimately, Miller contends that by offering only half-measures and refusing to fully commit to the necessary costs of the war, the US effectively “chose defeat.” The book serves as a candid historical record, aiming to help future leaders avoid repeating the same strategic blunders that defined the twenty-year conflict .
